Richard Striner Woodrow Wilson and World War I Review
Uncle Sam and old President Theodore "Teddy" Roosevelt (the Teddy bear) call the nation to preparedness in the face up of ascension German propaganda and attacks on American ships in 1917. President Wilson ignored the appeals from Teddy Roosevelt to prepare the nation for war, instead, clinging to the ethics of neutrality and the view of his Secretarial assistant of War, Newton Bakery, that "to fix for war violates the terms of neutrality." Thousands of inexperienced Amerian Soldiers would pay the cost of this unpreparedness in 1918.
This article is based on COL Mastriano's address to our History Institute for Teachers on America's Entry into WWI, hosted and cosponsored by the First Division Museum at Cantigny on April 9-x, 2016.
The unpreparedness of the United states of america Ground forces for war on the Western Front was directly linked to the national strategy that Woodrow Wilson charted during his presidency. The loftier losses of American Soldiers in the Meuse Argonne, for negligible gains, was the harvest of an breathless and unrealistic policy pursued by President Wilson. Presidential leadership matters in the United states of america, and shapes the effectiveness and strength of its armed services. All books on the Meuse Argonne avoid a serious discussion on how U.s. National Strategy, and the decisions made by Wilson between 1914-1918, condemned to death thousands of young American men due to poor training, poor equipment and lack of readiness for the realities of modern war.
Wilson entered presidential politics with strange diplomacy far from his mind. After winning the hotly contested 1912 presidential election, Wilson's want was to transform America domestically. Earlier being sworn in, he confided to a friend, "It would exist the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign diplomacy."[1] His words were prophetic, every bit the fate of nations rested on his shoulders and the decisions he made, shaped our world.
What was President'southward strategy in the First World War? Wilson's posturing would be considered a National Security Strategy, which the United States Army War College defines as "…the art and science of developing and using the political, armed services, economical, and advisory powers of a nation, during peace and war, to protect and promote national interests."[2] With this in mind, the focus volition be on Wilson'south grand strategy, which Paul Kennedy defines as,
The crux of k strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation'southward leaders to join all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation'southward long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) all-time interests.[3]
Few could predict that the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo would trigger a global catastrophe. Even so, the shots fired on that idyllic summer day of June 28, 1914, would atomic number 82 to the plummet of four dynasties, redraw the borders of vast swaths of Africa, Asia and Europe, and set the weather condition for a second and bloodier globe war. Every bit the European powers stumbled towards all-out war in the summer of 1914, several of its leaders were vacationing, making the calamity of 1914 seem peculiar, if not the predestined hand of God. Withal, providence was non the reason for this calamity; rather, it was Europe's leaders, who created the complex web of alliances that caused this globe war.
As vast armies clashed across Europe, President Wilson delivered a message to Congress on August nineteen, 1914, where he outlined the American strategy. Wilson declared, "The United States must exist neutral in fact, as well as in name, during these days that are to attempt men's souls. We must exist impartial in thought, as well as action."[4] Neutrality would exist the guiding principle of American strategy for the next three years, hoping that the world would return to the status quo when state of war ended. Yet Wilson's proclamation of neutrality was difficult, if not incommunicable to maintain. The Usa was an exporter of manufactured goods and raw materials to both warring factions in Europe. In this, France and the United Kingdom had the advantage with their Atlantic access and geography. Equally the state of war dragged on, and German admission to American markets evaporated, how could the United States maintain pure neutrality when its merchandise gave the British and French an advantage?
By 1915, the European powers were far from achieving their state of war aims . The French had failed to retake Alsace/Lorraine; the Germans did not capture Paris; the British faced a powerful German Navy; and Russia was stymied in the Due east. Wilson's Secretary of Land, William Jennings Bryan, was at a loss on how the neutrality of the United States could shape the outcome of the precarious European War.[five] As the fighting continued, the Germans sought an alternate way to knock the British out of the war. The German language plan was to utilize submarines (U-Boats) to deprive the U.k. what it needed to remain in the war. If successful, this would force London to withdraw its support from France and result in victory for Berlin in Europe.
Wilson's k strategy of maintaining neutrality evolved to include using affairs to end the war through American led negotiations.[half dozen] In upshot, the president wanted to "reset" relations with the Germans, French, and British, none of whom were eager to rebuff the credulity of the American proposition. Of the warring parties, Berlin offered the virtually hope to Wilson'southward diplomats for a negotiated peace. This, however, had less to exercise with wanting peace, than that Federal republic of germany had the reward, having conquered large sections of France and Kingdom of belgium. In exasperation, the French Ambassador to the United States, Jean Jules Jusserand, rebuffed American impudence and naivety, saying, "…we would accept [peace]… when the Germans… give u.s.a. dorsum the lives of our dead ones."[7]
As President Wilson struggled with how to talk the warring nations out of fighting, he concluded upward on a standoff course with the German Imperial Navy, as the German language leadership decided to give their fleet of U-Boats a free manus in sinking merchant vessels in the open seas in hopes of breaking the stalemate on the Western Front. Until March 1915, German language U-Boats as a rule did much to ensure that merely vessels in violation of police (i.due east. carrying appurtenances of war), were attacked. This oftentimes included the German U-Boats surfacing and either inspecting a vessel, or allowing its occupants to abandon ship before it was torpedoed. Merchant ships from the belligerent nations somewhen took advantage of this German policy by ramming the U-Boats, or firing on them. This, combined with the stagnation on the Western Front, compelled Kaiser Wilhelm to issues orders on April 3, 1915 "…to torpedo [merchant ships] on sight." The High german Foreign Office alerted neutral nations of this alter in policy.[eight] Just a few days before this change in policy, withal, a German U-Boat sank the SS Falaba, on March 28, 1915 killing American citizen Leon Thrasher.[9] Later on this, the American ship Gulfight was attacked, killing ii more than Americans. Things came to a head with the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915. The send sank so speedily that ane,195 passengers and crew died, 128 of whom were Americans.[ten]
Outrage spread across the U.s.a. against Federal republic of germany. President Wilson was at a crossroads, where the viability of his strategy towards the war was clearly non working. Yet, his only activity was to transport three diplomatic notes to Berlin, (1) affirming the right of Americans to transit the open seas, (2) the repudiation of the counter-arguments from Germany that the British naval occludent was illegal and finally, (3) whatever farther sinking of ships with Americans on board would exist viewed as "deliberately unfriendly" towards the United states.[11]
Despite the loss of American lives, and the attacks on U.S. vessels, Wilson refused to reconsider his strategy. He additionally took no serious action to set the nation for war, or to protect its citizens from further loss of life or fabric. Peace at all costs was his view, and the platform of his Democratic Party. Nonetheless even his mild notes were too much for some of his Cabinet. So incensed was William Jennings Bryan over the harsh tone Wilson used in the 2nd note to the Kaiser, that he resigned as Secretarial assistant of State. Bryan wanted a truly neutral arroyo to the situation. Every bit he considered the starvation of the German people by the British naval occludent, he rebuffed Wilson and said, "why be so shocked past the drowning of a few people, if in that location is to be no objection to starving a nation." [12] Yet, the tone of Wilson'southward annotation from whatsoever perspective was not hostile or threatening. This, however, betrays the state of Wilson'south Political party and his assistants that kept America weak and unprepared. Just three days afterwards the sinking of the Lusitania, Wilson gave his "Likewise proud to fight speech," where with inconceivable detachment from reality, he proclaimed, "The example of America must exist the example not just of peace considering information technology volition not fight, merely of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a affair as a homo being so right information technology does not demand to convince others by force that it is correct."[xiii]
This speech communication declared that Wilson'south strategy towards the First Globe State of war remained unchanged. Thus, in 1916, as the war entered its 2nd and bloodiest year, the credibility and power of the The states was tarnished by inaction and dithering. Indeed Wilson and his political party stood for "peace at nigh whatsoever price." Newton D. Baker, the new Secretary of War, declared in 1916, "I am a pacifist. I am a pacifist in my hope; I am a pacifist in my prayers; I am a pacifist in my belief…"[14] History would judge that neither Bryan nor Baker could see across their credo to grasp how dangerous and detached the American strategy had go. Indeed, they refused to believe that not all people were equally good intentioned or as well pregnant, as they believed themselves to be. Meanwhile, every bit Baker pontificated on his opinions on pacifism and peace, millions of men were perishing along the Western Front.
In the face of German language submarine warfare, and the inability to secure a mediated peace, the "reset" had failed. Yet, the Wilson Administration would endeavour to talk the belligerents out of fighting. President Wilson clung to the idea that he could, through high-minded speeches, cleverly crafted diplomatic messages and past highly-seasoned to the logic of learned men, negotiate an end to the calamitous state of war. The focus of Wilson'south energies for the next year would exist to find a way to end the war via American arbitration.
1916 was a presidential election year, and with reelection his primary focus, Wilson's arroyo to the Peachy War did not change.[fifteen] The Autonomous party invoked the slogan, "He kept usa out of the state of war,"[16] and during the 1916 Convention, Wilson pledged to keep the nation neutral, and lambasted his Republican rivals as amateurs when it came to foreign affairs.[17] It was he, an enlightened leader of an enlightened political party, who would lead the nation into a "new age."[eighteen]
Despite regurgitating the oft-repeated lines regarding neutrality, it was evident in 1916 that the war would forever alter Europe. Because of this realization, Wilson'southward vision for the post Earth War World began to modify. In a voice communication delivered to the League to Enforce Peace, Wilson called for international institutions to prevent such a cataclysm from occurring again. This idea would get the basis for the League of Nations. Wilson went on to list three fundamentals that would forever change the old international order. His first fundamental attacked colonialism and declared the right for all people "to choose the sovereignty under which they live" (self-determination). Wilson's second fundamental, influenced by the tragic state of affairs in Kingdom of belgium, asserted that all nations, small or large, take the right to territorial integrity. His 3rd cardinal was that the earth should live in freedom and peace.[19] This final idea hinted that but a democratic (republican) form of government could make this possible. The relevance of Wilson'southward calling for a new international gild, and his iii guiding principles should not exist lost to the reader, equally these were key concepts for the Clinton and 2 Bush administrations in 1990-2008.[twenty]
Yet, Wilson seemed less in touch with reality in the months leading upward to America's entry into war in April 1917. Relying upon lofty speeches, and high-minded expression, Wilson spoke of achieving "peace without victory."[21] The hollowness of his profound rhetoric was mere background noise to the at present exhausted and bloodied participants of the state of war. He pontificated how a peaceful future would include a new balance of power, with cooperation among the nations to maintain peace, freedom of the seas (and freedom of trade) and a new birth of freedom and justice (democracy) effectually the world.[22]
The lofty rhetoric notwithstanding, the reality of the state of war would soon crash upon the United States. In an endeavor to interruption the British, Kaiser Wilhelm ordered unrestricted submarine warfare to resume on February i, 1917. As more than 100 High german U-Boats sank half a million tons of aircraft in just twenty-eight days, Wilson was compelled to severe diplomatic ties with Berlin.[23] Still, beyond this, Wilson dithered on how to reply. Further complicating matters for him, the British released an intelligence intercept in which German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann, pledged support for Mexico if they attacked the The states.[24] This, combined with the effects of the unrestricted submarine warfare was too much for the Usa. Facing overwhelming public pressure level, Wilson acquiesced. On April two, 1917, Wilson asked Congress to declare a state of war against Germany.[25]
Wilson's war speech was a dramatic turn when he called for the nation to defeat the German Empire. This would encompass mobilizing the nation for war and rapidly expanding the army and navy. The goals that he laid out in this wartime strategy included upholding his three principles, earth peace, liberation of the oppressed peoples and creating a partnership of democratic nations to ensure the peace in the future (which he would later call the League of Nations), so that, "The world must exist made safety for democracy."[26]
Despite the declaration, the U.s.a. Regular army was non prepare to fight a modern war. The American Regular army in April 1917 encompassed barely 220,000 men, smaller than the 1914 Belgian Army. To chemical compound matters, the U.s.a. Ground forces only had experience and doctrine for fighting small-scale counter insurgency wars. Yet, this small forcefulness would expand to more than than 4 million. Two million of these would serve in Europe past the end of the war. Raising the manpower to create a large army was only part of the challenge. The equipping, preparation and readiness of this large army required time .
As the Americans tardily mobilized for war, there was a crisis in Europe. British manpower was weakening, a portion of the French Army mutinied and Russia fell to a revolution. In the midst of this, the Americans needed a year to go a substantial force to France and it seemed that it would exist too late. With the French downward, and the Russians out, Germany seized upon the opportunity. During the winter of 1917-1918, a million German soldiers moved from the Eastern Front and launched five large offensives on the Western Front to knock the British and French out of the war earlier enough Americans arrived to make a deviation. The German gamble nearly succeeded.[27]
Meanwhile, afterwards declaring war, Woodrow Wilson appointed General John J. Pershing to pb the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). In their only coming together during the war, General Pershing and the Secretary of War (Newton Baker), met with President Wilson on May 24, 1917. President Wilson delegated considerable discretion to Pershing in the arrangement and operations of the AEF.[28]
As the AEF hastily prepared for state of war, Wilson outlined his wartime grand strategy in January 1918 in a spoken communication dubbed "The 14 Points." Thus was borne the ideals of Wilsonianism.[29] The key concepts in this revolutionary vision for the hereafter encompassed five basic fundamentals, which some have referred to as "Liberal Imperialism;"[xxx]
- Autonomous states provide peace and stability
- Free trade cardinal to global prosperity
- International laws and international institutions are essential to maintain order, peace and security
- Collective security as must to maintain peace
- The United states is "chosen" to lead this new earth order.[31]
These emerged as foundational principles of how the Us would interact with the world, during the negotiations at Versailles in 1919 and especially later the Second World War. However, there were still eleven months of fighting before Wilson would run into his ideas considered.
Of all the requirements to build and deploy this new and massive AEF, the nigh difficult task was to maintain an contained American Army. The Allies pressured, and at times, threatened Pershing to anneal their forces into existing British and French military formations. From a businesslike perspective, this fabricated sense. With affiliation, the Americans could enter combat rapidly, serving with experienced units and leaders. Additionally, information technology seemed that the Allies might actually lose the war when the Germans unleashed their powerful bound 1918 offensives.[32] Pershing allowed a temporary/emergency assignment of American units to French and British command, but once the crisis of 1918 ended; he demanded a return of his forces to the AEF.
With the Germans culminating on the Western Front in July 1918, the Centrolineal Supreme Commander (Generalissimo) Ferdinand Foch, summoned Pershing, the British and French Regular army leaders (Haig and Petain respectively) to his headquarters on July 24, 1918. Foch intimated that the Allies should have the initiative and launch a serial of attacks against the Germans. The assembled leaders at first balked at the idea, simply in the end, Foch won them over. The Allied and Associated Power (the USA) would launch a massive counteroffensive in September 1918.[33] This assail began on September 26, 1918 with a large Franco-American attack in the Meuse Argonne Region of French republic, which was followed by the other armies across the Western Front. The war would stop in forty-six days, with the Americans pouring more than i.2 million men into the fight, and holding more than of the front than whatever nation, except France. Although late for the war, the United states earned a prominent seat at the peace talks in 1919.
When the Offset World State of war concluded on the 11th hour, on the 11th day, of the 11th month of 1918, the United States emerged as a powerful strength in the world. Although Woodrow Wilson entered the peace talks at Versailles with hopes of creating a new world gild, information technology was not to exist. The European victors wanted to punish Germany for the war, fifty-fifty as they carved upwards the Middle E and elsewhere to dominate. Information technology would take a Second World State of war earlier many of Wilson's goals, and strategy would be realized.
Notwithstanding, the lack of military preparedness under the Wilson Assistants was his greatest blunder. His desire for peace was noble, simply equally it became increasingly clear that war would somewhen reach America'south shores, he did nothing. In the end, the The states generated a large fighting force, but the price came at a high cost, when untrained and ill-equipped men died fighting a seasoned and modern High german Army.[34] Thus is the toll of unpreparedness. Every bit Richard Striner put information technology:
Woodrow Wilson'due south self-devastation as a wartime leader started early on: the mistakes that would make him his own worst enemy began… at the start of World State of war I… Wilson sank into a mental condition that rendered him incapable of strategy. Nevertheless wise his decisions might have seemed at the fourth dimension to some, he made his get-go major blunders right abroad.[35]
The strategy and approach of President Wilson is worthy of contemplation equally there are lessons for us to ponder today. Indeed, historians accept a laboratory; information technology is called the past. The efficacy of studying history is to sympathize the past, to, hopefully, create a ameliorate, if not, a more than informed future. As the well-known philosopher George Santayana wrote, "Those who cannot remember the by are condemned to echo it."[36] People beyond history faced similar challenges and decisions; and their action or inaction, shaped the world in which we live today. As a writer in a 19th Century book wrote,
The vision recurs; the eastern sun has a second rise; history repeats her tale unconsciously, and goes off into a mystic rhyme; ages are prototypes of other ages, and the winding course of time brings us round to the same spot once again.[37]
The lessons of Wilson'southward strategy in the Kickoff World War echoes across the generations to us today, 100 years afterward. Long and articulate speeches are no replacement for preparedness and action. Dithering and indecision is a poor alibi for a coherent strategy. America experimented with a reset of relations, and leading from backside during the First World War , and information technology proved disastrous.
As the world commemorates the centennial of the almost catastrophic year of the Start Earth War, it seems that there are eerie similarities to today. The wise would look to the past to avoid the mistakes of the past. The loss of lives in the Meuse Argonne Campaign was just the result of an incoherent and incomprehensible Wilson strategy. The toll of such blunders, as demonstrated by President Wilson's arroyo in the Beginning Earth State of war, is too plush to contemplate.
[1] G. John Ikenberry, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Printing; 2009), 10.
[2] H. Richard Yarger and George F. Barber, "The U.Due south. Army War College Methodology for Determining Interests and Levels of Intensity," U.Southward. Army War Higher, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1997. Adapted from Department of National Security and Strategy, Directive Class 2: "War, National Policy & Strategy" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997) 118-125. Available online at the following link: https://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/natinte.htm (accessed 24 March 2016).
[3] Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, (New Haven, CT, Yale University Printing, 1991), 5.
[4] Woodrow Wilson,Message to Congress, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Doc. No. 566 (Washington, 1914), pp. three-4. Available online at the following site: https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Declaration_of_Neutrality (accessed 24 March 2016).
[v] Alphabetic character from Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to Sir Arthur Nicolson, concerning William Jennings Bryan's Opinion of the Peachy State of war, Nov 13, 1914. Available online at the post-obit website: https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Letter_Concerning_William_Jennings_Bryan's_Opinion_of_the_Great_War (accessed 25 March 2016).
[half dozen] Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden too Swell to Bear, (New York, Rowman & Littlefield; 2014), 16-17.
[7] Quoted in; Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden also Groovy to Acquit, (New York, Rowman & Littlefield; 2014), 12.
[8] Walter Görlitz (editor), The Kaiser and His Court, (London, MacDonald Publishers; 1961), 70-72. This book is a compilation of the eye witness accounts of Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, Master of the High german Royal Navy Cabinet during the First Earth War.
[9] Richard Compton-Hall, Submarines at State of war 1914-1918, (Cornwall, Great britain, Periscope Publishing; 2004), 195-197. 343.
[10] David Ramsey, Lusitania: Saga and Myth, (New York, W.W> Norton and Company; 2001), 59-63; and Thomas Bailey, The Lusitania Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy, (New York, The Free Printing; 1975).
[11] Woodrow Wilson, First Lusitania Note, May 13, 1915. Bachelor online at the post-obit link: https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson's_First_Lusitania_Note_to_Germany (accessed 25 March 2016); besides see the following webpage defended to research on the RMS Lusitania, https://www.rmslusitania.info/primary-docs/wilson-notes/ (accessed 25 March 2016).
[12] Donald Schmidt, The Folly of War; American Foreign Policy 1898-2005, (New York, Algora Publishers; 2005), 78-79.
[xiii] Woodrow Wilson, "Americanism and the Strange Born" May x, 1915. Bachelor online at the following site: https://www.rmslusitania.info/primary-docs/too-proud-to-fight/ (accessed 25 March 2016).
[14] C.H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker: A Biography, (New York, The World Publishing Visitor; 1961), 80-82.
[15] Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden too Keen to Behave, (New York, Rowman & Littlefield; 2014), 35.
[16] Thomas J. Knock, To Cease All Wars, (New York, Oxford University Press; 1992), 106.
[17] Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World State of war I: A Brunt likewise Great to Bear, (New York, Rowman & Littlefield; 2014), 74-77.
[18] Woodrow Wilson, Spoken communication of Credence, September 2, 1916. Available online at the following site: https://millercenter.org/president/wilson/speeches/speech-3795 (accessed 25 March 2016).
[19] Woodrow Wilson, "American Principles," Address delivered at the offset annual League to Enforce Peace Assembly, May 27, 1916. Bachelor online at the following link: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65391 (accessed 25 March 2016).
[20] Chiliad. John Ikenberry, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy" Wilsonianism in the 20-First Century, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Academy Printing; 2009), an excellent clarification of this in the introduction, 11-24.
[21] Woodrow Wilson, "Peace without victory," Jan 22, 1917. Available online https://www.firstworldwar.com/source/peacewithoutvictory.htm (accessed 25 March 2016).
[22] Woodrow Wilson, "Peace without victory," January 22, 1917. Bachelor online https://www.firstworldwar.com/source/peacewithoutvictory.htm (accessed 25 March 2016).
[23] John H. Morrow, The Great war: An Imperial History, (New York, Routledge; 2004), 200-205.
[24] Zimmerman confessed that the telegram was truthful when asked past an American reporter.
[25] Woodrow Wilson, "Wilson's War Message to Congress," April 2, 1917, available online at the following link: https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/alphabetize.php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress (accessed 25 March 2016).
[26] Woodrow Wilson, "Wilson'south War Message to Congress," April 2, 1917, available online at the post-obit link: https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/alphabetize.php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress (accessed 25 March 2016).
[27] Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, (Berlin, Ernest Siegfried Mittler und Sohn; 1919), 473-499.
[28] John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the Globe War, vol. ane, (New York, Frederick Stokes and Company; 1931, 36-38.
[29] Woodrow Wilson, "The Xiv Points," January 1918, available online at the following link: https://avalon.police.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (accessed 25 March 2016).
[30] Adapted from Thou. John Ikenberry, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press; 2009), xi-13.
[31] Adapted from G. John Ikenberry, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-Kickoff Century, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Academy Press; 2009), 11-13.
[32] Georges Clemenceau, The Grandeur and Misery of Victory, (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company; 1930), 74-76.
[33] Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, translated by Colonel T. Bentley Mott, (Garden City, New York, Double Solar day, Duran and Company; 1931), 398
[34] United States Army in the Globe State of war 1917-1919, (Washington, DC, Centre of War machine History; 1988), 3-21.
[35] Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden also Great to Carry, (New York, Rowman & Littlefield; 2014), 1.
[36] George Santayana, The Life of Reason, (New York, Charles Schreiber'due south and Sons; 1920), 284.
[37] A. N. Mouravieff, The Christian Remembrancer, Vol. 10, "A History of the Church in Russia," (London, James Burn Publishers; 1845), 265.
Source: https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/05/dithering-dreaming-speechmaking-wilsons-strategy-first-world-war/
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